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The FOMC in 1989: Walking a
Tightrope
IL HE FEDERAL Open Market Committee
(FOMC) sought to balance the risk of infla-
tionary pressures against that of a weakening
economy in 1989, the seventh year of the cur-
rent economic expansion.’ The changing relative
intensity of these risks, as perceived by the
FOMC (hereafter, the Committee), influenced
the course of monetary policy throughout the
year.
Because the Committee believed that long-run
price stability is necessary to promote maximum
sustainable economic growth over time, the
perceived risks of inflationary pressures greatly
influenced its decisions early in the year. As the
year progressed, however, it became increasing-
ly apparent to the Committee that the economic
expansion was weakening. At the same time,
the Committee’s perception of the trend in infla-
tion became slightly more optimistic. According-
ly, the weight that the Committee attached to
reducing the risks of a slowdown in economic
activity increased somewhat throughout the se-
cond half of 1989. Nevertheless, the Committee’s
concern about future price pressures and the
importance of maintaining its own credibility as
an inflation-fighter remained in the forefront of
its deliberations.
This article reviews the formulation of mone-
tary policy by the Committee in 1989. The dis-
cussion focuses on how changing economic con-
ditions influenced the Committee’s decisions as
it balanced the risk of future inflation against
that of a future slowdown in economic activity.
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The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System reports to Congress twice a
year on its annual growth rate targets for the
monetary and debt aggregates. The one-year
target periods run from the fourth quarter of
the previous year to the fourth quarter of the
current year. These reports are mandated by
the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act
of 1978 (or the Humphrey-Hawkins Act). After
its first meeting of the year in February, the
Committee submits a report on its monetary
and debt growth objectives for the current
year. In July, upon reviewing the progress it
has made toward achieving its objectives for the
NOTE: Citations to the Record refer to the “Record of
Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee” as
published in various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Citations to “Report” refer to the “Monetary Policy Report
to the Congress,” which is also published in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin.
‘See the shaded insert on pages 18 and 19 for a descrip-
tion of the Committee’s membership during 1989.19
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first half of the year, the Committee decides
whether to adjust or retain its target for the
current year and establishes tentative targets
for the following year. Shortly after the July
meeting, a report of the Committee’s decisions
is submitted to Congress. Table 1 summarizes
the Committee’s long-run monetary growth ob-
jectives for 1989 as reported to Congress.
As was the case in the previous two years,
the Committee did not establish a target range
for Ml in 1989. The Committee believed that
the unpredictable relation of Ml to economic
activity and prices did not warrant reliance on
this aggregate as a guide to the implementation
of monetary policy.2
To underscore its commitment to resist future
inflationary pressures and to make progress
toward reasonable price stability, the Committee
reaffirmed the 1989 targets for M2 and M3, 3
to 7 percent and 3½ to 7½percent, respective-
ly, that had been set tentatively in July 1988.’
These target ranges for M2 and M3 ss’ere 1 and
½ percentage points, respectively, lower than
those established for 1988.
The Committee also decided to maintain the 4
percentage-point spreads between the upper
and lower bounds of the target ranges for the
two broad monetary aggregates. Until two years
ago, this spread had been 3 percentage points.
The wider ranges were adopted in 1988 when
the Committee concluded that the relations of
M2 and M3 growth to economic growth and in-
flation had become considerably more variable
and, therefore, that estimates of growth rates
for these aggregates that would be consistent
with the Committee’s objectives for the economy
were subject to greater uncertainty. Forecasting
the appropriate growth rates was made more
difficult by the Committee’s uncertainty about
the impact of future developments on thrift in-
stitutions and the subsequent effect on the
2Recorrj (May 1989), pp. 357-58. See Hafer and Hastag
(1988), who discuss the Committee’s decision to omit a
target range for Ml.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The July Report also stated that the 1989
target ranges for M2 and M3 would be extended
tentatively to 1990. While the Committee recog-
nized that a further reduction in the growth of
the monetary aggregates would be more consis-
tent with attaining price stability over time,
many members believed that more rapid M2
growth might be necessary to promote
reasonable growth in economic activity in 1990.
Reductions in the ranges would increase the like-
lihood of making policy appear unpredictable by
increasing the possibility of a reversal later or of
having to tolerate growth rates exceeding the
lower target ranges. The targets for 1990 could
be adjusted in February, if appropriate.°
Table 2 indicates that the actual rate of growth
in Ma during 1989, 4.8 percent, was close to
the middle of its target range. The actual rate
of growth in M3, 3.3 percent, however, was
slightly below the lower bound of its target
range. The growth rates varied considerably
during the year as illustrated in figures 1 and 2,
which show the monthly averages of (revised)
daily figures, respectively, for M2 and M3. As dis-
cussed below, these variations had some in-
fluence on the Committee’s short-run policy
decisions.
SHORT-RUN POLICY OBJECTIVES
Each year, the Committee holds eight regular-
ly scheduled meetings to review incoming data
and assesses the current economic environment
and the prospects for the future course of the
economy. Based on this information, the mem-
bers determine what changes, if any, should be
made in short-run monetary policy to achieve
the Committee’s long-term goals. At the close of
each meeting, the Committee issues a domestic
policy directive to the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York. This directive serves as the basis for
day-to-day implementation of policy in the inter-
1989
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meeting period by the Manager for Domestic
Operations, who is responsible for executing the
directives. As usual, the directives issued during
1989 primarily emphasized the degree of re-
straint on reserve positions (maintain, increase or
decrease) that was considered by the members
to be consistent with the Committee’s money
growth targets and goals for the economy.
Maintaining the approach used since October
1982, the Federal Reserve System followed a
borrowed-reserves operating procedure. This
procedure translates the degree of reserve re-
straint specified in the directive into a target for
borrowed reserves (reserves borrowed from the
Federal Reserve Banks). For example, under this
procedure, an instruction to increase the degree
of pressure on reserve positions would imply a
higher target for borrowed reserves (adjustment
plus seasonal borrowings) and a higher federal
funds rate for a given discount rate.7
Toward the end of 1988 and continuing into
1989, however, this operating procedure was
complicated by the unstable relation between the
demand for borrowed reserves and the federal
funds rate. Specifically, the willingness of deposi-
tory institutions to borrow reserves, for given
federal funds and discount rates, was declining
unexpectedly. At the December 1988 meeting,
the Committee considered the possibility of ad-
justing the operating procedure to shift the focus
‘The positive relation between borrowed reserves and the
federal funds rate follows from economic theory.
Specifically, the demand for borrowed reserves (the bor-
rowings function”) is negatively related to the opportunity
cost of borrowing from the discount window. This cost
equals the spread between the discount rate (the interest
rate paid by depository institutions for borrowed reserves
from Federal Reserve Banks) and the federal funds rate
(the interest rate paid for reserves borrowed from other
depository institutions). For a discussion of the implemen-
tation of monetary policy under the borrowed-reserves
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of policy implementation to the federal funds
rate, but the members generally agreed that ad-
hering to the current procedure would be ap-
propriate given its advantages.~Nevertheless, the
Committee believed that the uncertainty about
the relation of borrowings to the federal funds
rate warranted flexibility in implementing mone-
tary policy. Hence, some of the directives issued
in 1989 were written with the understanding
that flexibility would be permitted in conducting
day-to-day policy so as to achieve the Commit-
tee’s objectives, given the changing conditions in
the market for borrowed reserves.
Furthermore, the Committee maintained the
flexibility in short-run policy adopted in previous
years because of uncertainty about the relations
of monetary aggregate growth to output growth
and inflation. The Committee believed that short-
run policy should be decided not only on the
basis of the behavior of the monetary aggre-
gates, but on the basis of indicators of infla-
tionary pressures, economic growth and the
changing conditions in domestic financial and
foreign exchange markets.°
In addition to the desired degree of reserve
pressure, the directives indicated potential
modifications in the intermeeting period, and
the expected growth rates of M2 and M3 condi-
tional on the desired reserve restraint. Each
directive also established a monitoring range for
the federal funds rate. The Chairman could in-
itiate a Committee consultation if, during the in-
termeeting period, the federal funds rate were
to move out of that range. Over the past several
years, however, such consultations have been
initiated because of unexpected economic and
financial developments.
The following discussion reviews each FOMC
meeting chronologically. It focuses on the im-
portant economic developments of 1989, show-
ing how they influenced the Committee’s formu-
lation of short-run policy objectives. Table 3
summarizes the directives issued in 1989. Table
4 shows the actual (revised) intra-year growth
rates in Ma and M3, as well as those rates ex-
pected by the Committee.
.Februariv •7-8 .MeetjrL~
Economic data reviewed at this meeting sug-
gested that, abstracting from the direct impact
of the previous year’s drought, economic
growth continued at a fast pace. The marked
increase in total nonfarm payroll employment in
January was widespread and the civilian unem-
ployment rate of 5.4 percent was only marginal-
ly above December’s rate of 5.3 percent. Indus-
trial production rose sharply in December and
January and the industrial capacity utilization
rate in January exceeded its average rate over
the fourth quarter of the previous year.1°
Indicators of inflation at the beginning of
1989 showed hardly any change from 1988. Al-
though the producer price index rose sharply in
December, the behavior of the consumer price
index, excluding food and energy, was perceived
to be in line with its pattern in 1988.” Labor
costs, particularly wages and salaries, rose appre-
ciably faster than one year earlier, however.
As instructed by the Committee’s last directive
in 1988, the degree of pressure on reserve posi-
tions was increased at the beginning of the pre-
vious intermeeting period. During this period,
the average level of adjustment plus seasonal
borrowings was slightly above $500 million and
the federal funds rate rose to about 9 percent
from about 8½percent. As other market inter-
est rates rose, the growth of the broader
monetary aggregates, particularly Ma, weakened
in January.12
8Record (April 1989), pp. 295-96. Also see, for example,
Record (May 1989), p. 359. The particular advantage of
the current operating procedure mentioned in the Commit-
tee’s discussion was that it permits ‘greater scope for
market forces to determine short-term interest rates.”
(Record (April 1989), p. 296.] Such a procedure, however,
can be less effective in maintaining short-term control over
the money stock if the borrowings function is subject to
unexpected shifts that are not quickly identified and
reflected in changes to the borrowings assumption. See
Thornton (1988) for a discussion on the advantages and
disadvantages of this procedure.
9Report (March 1989), p. 108.
‘°Record(May 1989), p. 353. Industrial production rose at
annual rates of 4.4 percent and 3.5 percent, respectively,
in December and January. The Board’s measure of the
total industry capacity utilization rate in January was 84.3
percent, up from the previous quarter’s average of 84.1
percent.
lilbid., pp. 353-54. The annual growth rate ofthe seasonally
adjusted producer price index for finished goods was 3.3
percent in December, while the seasonally adjusted con-
sumer price index for all urban consumers rose at an an-
nual rate of 4.1 percent. Excluding food and energy, the
latter index rose at an annual rate of 4.9 percent.
i2lbid., p. 354. In January, M2 rose sluggishly at an annual
rate of 0.5 percent and M3 rose at an annual rate of2.4
percent.Table 3
The FOMC’s Short-Run Operating Ranges for 1989
Expected Degree lntermeeting
growth of federal
Date of Target rates reserve funds
Meeting period M2 M3 pressure1 range
February 7-8. December 1988- 2% 31/2% maintain 7-11%
1989’ March 1989 (+)
March 28. 1989~ March-June 3 5 maintain 8-12
(+)
May 16, j9994 March-June 1½ 4 maintain 8-12
July 5-6, 1989~ June-September 7 7 slightly reduce 7-11
August 22, 19896 June-September 97 maintain 7-11
(.—)
October 3, 1989’ September- 61/2 4½ maintain 7-11
December 1—)
November 14, September- 7’/2 41/2 maintain 7-11
19896 December
December 18-19. November 1989- 81/2 51/2 slightly reduce 6-10
1989° March 1990
IA - +‘ indicates an expectation that during the intermeeting period developments were more
likely to warrant an adjustment toward restraint than toward ease. The opposite is true for a
2Messrs. Hoskins and Parry dissented. Mr. Hoskins thought that an immediate move toward
greater monetary restraint would be appropriate to put policy on a course toward price stability
in the longer run. Mr Parry stressed that, since economic growth had exceeded its long-run.
noninflationary rate, inflationary pressures were already increasing. In their view, without an
immediate increase in restraint on reserve positions, inflationary pressures would intensify and
thereby make the task of achieving the Committee’s anti-inflationary goal more difficult.
~Ms.Seger dissented. Although maintaining the existing degree of reserve pressure was ap-
propriate in her view, she believed that the bias toward monetary restraint was undesirable in
light of the lagged effects of appreciable tightening that had been undertaken earlier along
with current indications of slower economic growth.
4Mr. Melzer dissented, advocating prompt action to ease the degree of reserve pressure slight-
ly. Pointing to the past two years of slow money growth, he stressed that the current high in-
flation would be reduced eventually and that, in the absence of an easing action, the risks of
a recession would be augmented. Reaching the System’s non-inflationary goal would be
hampered if, in response to a recession, monetary policy were to aim at a quick recovery.
°Ms.Seger dissented. She favored a greater degree of easing that. in her view, would be
necessary to promote reasonable economic growth in the following years.
°Mr.Guffey dissented. He could accept an unchanged policy. But he believed that a directive
that was biased toward ease was not appropriate given that the chances of a weakening of
the economic expansion appeared to be essentially the same as the chances of a strengthen-
ing of the expansion while, in his view, the current and expected future inflation rates were
not acceptable. Furthermore, such a bias toward ease could lessen confidence in the Commit-













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Some members advocated an immediate tight-
ening of reserve conditions to contain any future
inflationary pressures. In their view, without im-
mediate action, the task of achieving price
stability could become more difficult. Other
members expressed concern that additional
pressure on reserve positions could aggravate
the financial conditions of many thrift institutions
and highly indebted firms. In addition, further re-
straint might add to the recent unusual strength
of the dollar.” Although the recent slow growth
of the monetary aggregates was thought to indi-
cate future restraint on price pressures, some
members cautioned that a shortfall from
targeted ranges would be a matter of concern.’0
At the end of the meeting, the Committee
adopted a directive that called for an unchanged
degree of pressure on reserve positions, with a
possible increase or decrease depending on forth-
coming information about inflationary pressures,
the strength of business expansion, growth in
the monetary aggregates and developments in
foreign exchange and domestic financial markets.
As table 3 indicates, however, there was a
“bias” toward restraint, and the members called
for “remaining alert to potential developments
that might require some firming during the in-
termeeting period.”~In light of the continuing
uncertainty about the relation of the demand
for borrowed reserves to the federal funds rate,
the directive was issued with the explicit under-
standing that flexibility would be needed in im-
plementating monetary policy. Given the con-
templated reserve conditions, the Committee ex-
pected the annual growth rates for M2 and M3
to be around 2 percent and 3½percent, respec-
tively, from December to March, The directive
left the range for the federal funds rate un-
changed at 7 to 11 percent.18
March 28 Meeting
During the intermeeting period, additional
pressure was placed on reserve positions, in
light of incoming data indicating greater infla-
tionary pressures. Also, on February 24, the
Board of Governors approved a5 0basis-point
increase in the discount rate to 7 percent. From
the time of the increase in the discount rate to
this meeting, the federal funds rate rose nearly
75 basis points to slightly above 9¾percent.
Other market interest rates, especially those on
shorter-term securities, also rose. As the de-
mand for borrowed reserves appeared to fall,
the borrowings assumption was lowered as a
technical adjustment. The average of adjustment
plus seasonal borrowings during the six-week
period just before this meeting fell to about
$450 million. Although the monetary aggregates
appeared to gain some strength in February and
March, their growth was viewed as sluggish re-
lative to that in the previous year.’9
The information available for review at this
meeting suggested that economic activity ex-
panded considerably in the first quarter. Total
nonfarm employment advanced sharply in
February and the civilian unemployment rate
fell to 5.1 percent. Only part of the employment
gain was attributed to the unusually mild weath-
er during the first two months of the year.2°
There were, however, indications of a slight
weakening of the economic expansion. For ex-
ample, preliminary data suggested that industrial
production remained flat and capacity utilization
rates fell slightly in February.” Furthermore,
growth in consumer spending slowed in the
first two months of the year from its vigorous
pace during the last quarter of 1988. Although
the data indicated that the nominal U.S. mer-
chandise trade deficit improved in January, the
value of exports fell. But the observed net rise
of the trade-weighted value of the dollar over
the intermeeting period was attributed largely
to the rise in market interest rates stemming, in
part, from restrictive actions taken during that
period.”
“Ibid., pp. 358-59. As a measure of the relative strength of
the dollar in foreign exchange markets, the Federal
Reserve Board constructs a trade-weighted index using
the currencies of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ita-
ly, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom. The trade-weighted index rose about 6




March. M3 rose at annual rates of 3.3 percent and 6.2
percent, respectively, during those same two months.
20Ibid., p. 502. The civilian unemployment rate in February
has been revised upward to 5.2 percent.
2llbid. Revised data indicate that industrial production ac-
tually fell in February at an annual rate of 2.5 percent.
22lbid., pp. 502-03. The trade-weighted index of the value of
the dollar in foreign exchange markets rose approximately
1.5 percent over the intermeeting period.
“Record (July 1989), p. 503. M2 rose at annual rates of 1.8
percent and 3.5 percent, respectively, in February and‘1
Price pressures appeared to gain some
strength in the first two months of 1989. The
observed increases in price indexes were
thought to be due chiefly to energy and food
prices. Even excluding these components, how-
ever, the producer and consumer price indexes
rose sharply in January and February.”
The Board’s staff predicted that the pace of
economic expansion would slow considerably
from the pace in 1988. The forecast assumed
that monetary policy would restrain the infla-
tionary tendencies in the economy. Such a policy
could put additional pressure on financial mar-
kets and involve slower growth in consumer
spending and business fixed investment.”
The members generally agreed that, in light of
mixed evidence about the strength of economic
expansion and the uncertain prospects for the
future, an unchanged policy would be accept-
able. Some members, who preferred an immedi-
ate tightening of reserve conditions, believed
that inflationary pressures could intensify given
the apparent momentum in economic activity.
These members, however, were willing to wait
for additional information that tended to confirm
their fears. Most members believed that the
unusual strength of the dollar in foreign ex-
change markets would dampen price pressures.
Furthermore, as suggested by earlier ex-
perience, the sluggish growth in the monetary
aggregates lessened the likelihood that inflation
could gain much strength in the future.’~
As table 3 shows, the Committee adopted a
directive that did not call for a change in policy
but that permitted a policy adjustment during
the intermeeting period more readily toward
restraint than ease. Open market operations
were to be conducted with some degree of flex-
ibility because of the continuing uncertainty
about the relation of the demand of borrowed
reserves to the federal funds rate. Growth in
M2 and M3 were expected to be around 3 per-
cent and 5 percent, respectively, from March to
June. The intermeeting range for the federal
funds rate was increased 1 percentage point to
8 to 12 percent, “in light of the tightening of
reserves since the February meeting and the
related increase in the federal funds rate.”2°
11:1ev ..i B Alerting
Aside from the slightly firmer reserve condi-
tions due to the greater-than-expected reserve
flows related to April tax payments, reserve
conditions hardly changed in the intermeeting
period. During this period, the average of adjust-
ment plus seasonal borrowing rose to about
$565 million, while the rate at which federal
funds traded rose slightly to around 9-7/8 per-
cent. Other market interest rates, especially
short-term rates, fell over the intermeeting
period, however. Estimated growth of the mone-
tary aggregates was sluggish, with the cumula-
tive growth of M2 since the fourth quarter of
1988 well below the lower bound of the Com-
mittee’s target range and that of M3 just above
the lower limit of its target range.27
Economic data reviewed at this meeting sug-
gested that the expansion of economic activity
had moderated in recent months. Growth in
total nonfarm employment edged downward in
March and April, while the civilian unemploy-
ment rate climbed from 5.0 percent in March to
5.3 percent in April. In addition, growth in con-
sumer spending maintained the much slower
pace established in the first part of the year
relative to that in 1988, Industrial production
grew in April, but, from December to April, it
grew more slowly than it had in 1988. Much of
the April growth was attributed to an increase
in automobile assemblies after a weak first
quarter and a rebound in the output of other
consumer goods. Although the total capacity
utilization rate rose slightly in April, it remained
below its January rate.28
There were indications, however, that the
momentum in economic activity had not been en-
23lbid. The seasonally adjusted producer price index for
finished goods rose at annual rates of 13.9 percent and
7.8 percent, respectively, in January and February; ex-
cluding food and energy prices, it rose at annual rates of
6.2 percent and 7.2 percent, respectively, in January and
February. Similarly, the seasonally adjusted consumer
price index for all urban consumers rose at annual rates of
7.2 percent and 5.1 percent, respectively, during the first
two months of the year; excluding food and energy, this




27Record (September 1989), pp. 626-27. In April, M2 and M3
grow at annual rates of 1.0 percent and 2.6 percent,
respectivoly.
28lbid., p. 625. The annual growth rate in the industrial pro-
duction index rose from 1.7 percent in March to 8.9 per-
cent in April. During that month, the total capacity utiliza-
tion rate rose 0.4 percentage points from the previous
month to 84.2 percent.28
tirely lost. Capital business spending rebounded
after falling in the last quarter of 1988. Further-
more, although the nominal U.S. merchandise
trade deficit widened in February, the average
deficit for the first two months of 1989 remain-
ed below that for the fourth quarter of 1988,
with the value of exports growing more rapidly
than that of imports - Despite the slight deteriora-
tion in the external trade balance in February
and the general downward movement ininterest
rates more recently, the dollar gained further
strength in the intermeeting period.”
The recent behavior of the price indexes did
not ease the members’ fear of future inflation.
Rather, price level movements were interpreted
by the members as an indication that inflation-
ary pressures were rooted deeply in the econo-
my. Although the producer price index grew
more slowly in March and April than in the
earlier two months of the year, the consumer
price index grew at a slightly faster pace in the
first quarter of 1989 than in the previous
quarter. Increases in food and energy prices
contributed to the observed increases in mea-
sured inflation, but were not the sole driving
force of the perceived upward trend in infla-
tion.3°
The staff’s projection changed little from that
prepared for the previous meeting. Growth in
economic activity was expected to be slower
than in 1988. The forecast indicated that prices
at both the consumer and producer levels
would increase at somewhat faster rates in 1989.
In the staff’s view, monetary policy that at-
tempted to contain such inflationary pressures,
should they materialize, would imply greater
pressure on financial markets. In addition to a
continuation of sluggish growth in consumer
spending, the staff expected that growth in busi-
ness capital spending would retreat from its fast
pace in the first quarter.3’
Uncertainty about the impact of previous re-
strictive policy actions on inflation and the pace
of economic growth dominated the discussion at
this meeting. Whether monetary conditions
were sufficiently restrictive to contain future in-
flationary pressures without precipitating an ex-
cessive slowing of economic growth remained
unclear. Although one member believed that an
immediate easing of reserve pressure would be
both necessary and desirable to improve the
prospects for adequate monetary growth to sus-
tain the economic expansion, others feared the
risks associated with such a policy—that is, of
having to reverse the easing if the monetary ag-
gregates were to accelerate unduly and price
pressures were to intensify later.”
In the discussion about possible adjustments to
monetary policy in the intermeeting period, most
members agreed that no bias—either toward
restraint or ease—would be appropriate. While
one member believed that policy should be par-
ticularly alert tobehavior ofthe monetary aggre-
gates that could warrant some easing, others
believed that the deeply rooted inflationary
pressures called for a bias toward restraint. A
number of members expressed concern that the
absence of a bias toward restraint might give an
incorrect signal that the Committee was moving
away from its anti-inflationary commitment.’~
At the end of this meeting, the Committee
issued a directive that called for an unchanged
degree of pressure on reserve positions. Depen-
ding on forthcoming information, a move to
some restraint or ease would be acceptable dur-
ing the intermeeting period. The Committee
believed that continuing uncertainty about the
relation of the demand for borrowed reserves
to the federal funds rate warranted continuing
flexibility in the implementation of monetary
policy. The Committee expected that the contem-
plated reserve conditions would be consistent
with M2 and M3 growing at 1½and 4 percent
annual growth rates, respectively, from March
to June. The intermeeting range for the federal
funds rate was kept at 8 to 12 percent.34
July 5-6 Meeting
Late in the intermeeting period, incoming in-
formation tended to confirm earlier indications
“Ibid., pp. 625-26. The value of the dollar relative to the
other 0-10 currencies appreciated about 4 percent over
the intermeeting period.
“Ibid., p. 626. The seasonally adjusted consumer price in-
dex for all urban consumers rose at annual rates of 6.1
percent and 8.1 percent, respectively, in March and April.
Excluding food and energy prices, this price index rose
4.8 percent and 2.9 percent. The producer price index for
finished goods, excluding food and energy, rose at annual





that the economic expansion had slowed so that
the prospect of weakening inflationary pressures
seemed more promising. Furthermore, the mon-
etary aggregates continued to exhibit slow
growth and the dollar had gained considerable
strength earlier in the intermeeting period. Ac-
cordingly, a slight lowering of the pressure on
reserve positions was sought. Before this easing,
however, a technical upward revision had been
made to accommodate unusual strength in sea-
sonal borrowing. Over the six-week period end-
ing June 27, the average of adjustment plus
seasonal borrowings was around $550 million,
and the federal funds rate edged down to 9½
percent. Other market interest rates, especially
those on long-term securities, also fell. The ob-
served decline in the level of the broader mone-
tary aggregates during May was interpreted as
a reversal of the temporary rise in transaction
accounts related to April tax payments.”
Confirming earlier evidence, the information
available for review at this meeting suggested
that the economic expansion had slowed consid-
erably from its pace in 1988. While the civilian
unemployment rate fell to 5.2 percent in May,
growth in total nonfarm employment was rela-
tively weak. Preliminary data indicated that, in
May, growth in industrial production was modest
and the total capacity utilization rate had fallen
back to its March Ievel.30 While business capital
spending appeared to make further gains in the
second quarter, growth in consumer spending
remained sluggish. Further, the significant im-
provement in the nominal U.S. merchandise
trade balance during April stemmed chiefly
from a considerable drop in imports with only a
slight increase in exports.’7
Price pressures persisted despite the indica-
tions of slowing economic expansion. Increases
in food and energy prices, however, made large
contributions to the increases in the producer
price index and, to a lesser extent, in the con-
sumer price index.” Nevertheless, the growth in
labor costs appeared to have maintained its
momentum from the middle of 1988.
The Board’s staff revised its forecast for
economic growth in the second half of the year
downward from that made earlier in the year.
The staff’s forecast now suggested less inflation
than was previously expected, though more in-
flation than had been experienced in 1988, and
continued growth in labor costs in 1989. This
inflation outlook took account of the persistent
strengthening of the dollar that was expected to
dampen inflationary pressures. The forecast,
however, also pointed to slightly more favorable
inflationary conditions in 1990 than were
previously expected.”
In the context of a weaker outlook for
economic growth, the members generally believ-
ed that a further reduction in the degree of
pressure on reserve positions would be ap-
propriate. Although there was some disagree-
ment about the timing and the extent of such
easing, most members agreed that they could
accept an immediate slight reduction in reserve
pressure. In the view of many members, a
greater move toward ease could have an unde-
sirable effect on inflationary expectations, there-
by putting upward pressure on long-term inter-
est rates. A substantial move toward ease might
have to be reversed if inflationary pressures
subsequently intensified.
Nearly all believed, however, that the easing
should be implemented immediately given the
slowing pace of economic expansion and the
sluggish growth of the broader monetary aggre-
gates. Although some members preferred a direc-
tive that was biased toward restraint to main-
tain the credibility of the Committee’s anti-infla-
tionary commitment despite the easing of policy,
others advocated a bias toward ease to com-
municate the Committee’s belief that the risks
“Record (October 1989), p. 691. Revised data indicate that
in May, M2 declined at an annual rate of 1.6 percent and
M3 rose sluggishly at an annual rate of 0.2 percent. In
June, the annual growth rates in M2 and M3 rebounded to
6.5 percent and 6.0 percent, respectively.
“Ibid., p. 689. Revised data indicate that the industrial pro-
duction index fell at an annual rate of 0.8 percent in May,
while the total capacity utilization rate in May, which fell to
84.0 percent from 84.2 percent in April, was above the
rate of 83.8 percent in March.
‘ibid., pp. 689-90. Despite the improvement in the external
balance, the value of the dollar relative to the other 0-10
currencies fell on net about 3 percent over the in-
termeeting period. After having risen sharply in the first
half of the period, the trade-weighted index of the value of
the dollar declined appreciably over the second half.
“Ibid., p. 690. But, even excluding food and energy prices,
the seasonally adjusted producer price index advanced
sharply, rising at annual rates of 7.2 percent and 8.2 per-
cent, respectiv&y, in May and June. Similarly, the
seasonally adjusted consumer price index, excluding food
and energy components, rose 5.8 percent and 2.8 percent,
respectively, in May and June.
“Ibid., p. 691.30
of an undesirable shortfall in economic growth
were substantial. Most members agreed that,
given the prevailing uncertainty, they could ac-
cept an unbiased directive.~°
As table 3 shows, the directive issued by the
Committee at the close of this meeting called
for an immediate and slight reduction in the
degree of reserve pressure. Further easing or
some tightening was considered to be ap-
propriate depending on future developments.
Conditional on the contemplated reserve condi-
tions, the Committee expected that both M2 and
M3 would grow at an annual rate of 7 percent
from June to September. Given the easing of
reserve pressure in early June and that
specified in this directive, the monitoring range
for the federal funds rate was lowered 1
percentage point to 7 to 11 percent.4’
./lu.gust 2.2 Meeting
As instructed by the Committee at the close of
the previous meeting, the degree of pressure on
reserve positions was reduced at the beginning
of the intermeeting period. Toward the end of
July, the degree of reserve restraint was eased
further, in light of incoming data that indicated
a continued weaker economic expansion and a
slight reduction in inflationary pressures. At the
beginning of the intermeeting period, however,
the assumed level of adjustment plus seasonal
borrowing was increased as a technical revision
prompted by a projected rise in seasonal bor-
rowing during the summer months. Hence, the
average of adjustment plus seasonal borrowings
over the six-week period ending August 22 rose
to approximately $600 million despite the easing
actions taken during this period. Nevertheless,
the federal funds rate fell 50 basis points to
around 9 percent. Preliminary data indicated
that, in July, growth in the monetary aggregates
gained considerable strength, which appeared to
continue into August.4’
The data reviewed at this meeting reinforced
the earlier evidence of a moderate economic ex-
pansion. The data, however, suggested less weak-
ness in the expansion than they had toward the
end of July. Nonfarm payroll employment made
considerable advances in June and July. The ci-
vilian unemployment rates for these months, 5.3
percent and 5.2 percent, respectively, were
close to the average unemployment rate during
the first five months of the year. In addition,
preliminary data indicated that industrial produc-
tion rebounded in July after having fallen in
May and June.4’ Industrial capacity utilization
maintained its high rate, although the rate for
manufacturing in July was well below that in
January. Moreover, growth in consumer spend-
ing in the second quarter was stronger than ori-
ginally estimated, and the observed narrowing
of the nominal U.S. merchandise trade deficit
reflected not only a notable decline in the value
of imports, but a marked jump in the value of
exports.44
The recent behavior of price indexes sug-
gested somewhat less inflation primarily
because of appreciable declines in food and
energy prices. Preliminary data indicated that,
while the consumer price index rose in both
June and July, the increases were modest, and
the producer price index for finished goods
fell.~’Wage growth over the past several
months did not appear to deviate from previous-
ly established trends.
The staff expected that, during the rest of the
year, growth in the nonfarm economy would
maintain its pace from the first half of the year
and then grow more slowly in 1990. With inter-
est rates falling since the spring and the recent-
ly observed substantial job gains, consumer
spending was expected to exhibit greater
strength in the coming months. The forecast in-
dicated that business capital spending would
continue to make a large contribution toeconom-
ic growth. Partly because of the earlier strength-
40Ibid., p. 695.
41lbid., p. 696. In this instance, there was no mention of the
uncertainty revolving around the relationship between bor-
rowings and the federal funds rate and, therefore, no
reference to flexibility in monetary policy implementation.
42Record (December 1989), p. 813. Growth in M2 ac-
celerated from 6.5 percent in June to 10.3 percent in July.
The annual growth rate in M3 rose less dramatically from
6.0 percent in June to 6.9 percent in July.
4’Ibid., p. 812. Revised data, however, indicate that in-
dustrial production rose at an annual rate of 3.4 percent in
June and fell at an annual rate of 0.8 percent in July. The
July civilian unemployment rate has been revised upward
to 5.3 percent.
“Ibid., pp. 812-13.
~‘lbid.,p. 813. The seasonally adjusted producer price index
for finished goods rose at an annual rate of 1.1 percent in
June and fell at an annual rate of 4.1 percent in July. But,
excluding the food and energy prices, this index rose at
an annual rate of 8.2 percent in June and fell at an annual
rate of 1.9 percent in July.31
ening of the dollar in foreign exchange markets,
however, foreign trade was not expected to be
a significant source of economic growth. In ad-
dition, although expected further declines in
food and energy prices suggested that price
pressures could weaken in the coming quarter,
the staff expected no substantial improvement
in the inflationary trend through 1990.48
With evidence that the economic expansion
had stabilized at a “provisionally acceptable pace”
and that inflationary pressures were not gaining
strength, the members generally believed that
the current degree of reserve pressure should
be maintained, at least in the early part of the
intermeeting period. An unchanged course for
policy was also justified by the observation that
growth in M2 and M3 recently had gained suffi-
cient strength to place these aggregates in their
target ranges.47
Discussing possible adjustments in policy dur-
ing the intermeeting period, many members ex-
pressed the belief that, if future developments
were to warrant a change in policy, the direction
of change would most likely be toward some
ease. Some members, however, preferred not to
incorporate such a presumption in the directive.
In their view, the “risks to the economy were
more evenly balanced.” That is, the direction of
change in policy justified by developments in
the intermeeting period was just as likely to be
toward restraint as it was toward ease. Further,
these members believed that a bias toward ease
could “lead to a misreading of System policy in
the context of an unacceptably high rate of in-
flation.”~’
The directive issued at the end of this meeting
specified no immediate change in policy, as table
3 indicates. Despite some members’ reserva-
tions, the directive included a bias toward ease.
The Committee expected M2 and M3 to grow at
annual rates of about 9 percent and 7 percent,
respectively, from June to September. The inter-
meeting range for the federal funds rate was
kept at 7 to 11 percent.4°
Oct:~ehe.r 3 Itteeting
Over the intermeeting period, reserve condi-
tions displayed no noticeable change. The aver-
age of adjustment plus seasonal borrowing dur-
ing the four weeks ending September 20 fell
slightly to about $550 million, and the federal
funds rate fluctuated within a narrow range
centered around 9 percent. Although M2
growth was strong, M3 growth had unexpected-
ly lost some of its strength in August and prelim-
inary data suggested that this slower growth
had continued into September30
The data available for review at this meeting
reaffirmed earlier projections, that the economic
expansion had continued at a moderate pace in
the third quarter. Nonfarm payroll employment
generally made considerable advances after al-
lowing for the effects of strike activity. Neverthe-
less, there were hardly any job gains in manu-
facturing industries, and the civilian unemploy-
ment rate in August and September was close to
5¼percent. Further, after increasing moderate-
ly in August, industrial production fell slightly
in September.” The industrial capacity utiliza-
tion rate, however, remained relatively high.
While growth in business capital spending
seemed to have slowed in the third quarter, con-
sumer spending continued to exhibit consider-
able strength. With the value of imports declin-
4~lbid.,p. 814. Over the intermeeting period, the value of
the dollar relative to the other 0-10 currencies rose ap-
proximately 2.7 percent, almost offsetting the previous net
decline. Even so, the trade-weighted value of the dollar
was below the highs reached in June.
4~Ibid.,pp. 815-16. Although the staff predicted that M2 and
M3 growth would slow considerably from the current pace,
the growth in the aggregates was expected to remain com-
fortably within their target ranges. These forecasts for
money growth as well as those made subsequently in
1989, however, were subject to great uncertainty as a
result of the uncertainty revolving around the resolution of
thrift institution insolvencies and the responses of thrift in-
stitutions to recently enacted legislation. These factors
were expected to dampen growth in the broader monetary
aggregates, particularly that in M3. Thus, any observed
weakness in the growth of these aggregates would not be
interpreted as evidence of a slowing economy. Ibid., p.
“Ibid., p. 816.
“Ibid., pp. 816-17.
‘°Record(January 1990), pp. 18-19. The slowing of the
growth of the monetary aggregates was especially evident
in M3. M2 grew at annual rates of about 7.8 percent and
6.5 percent, respectively, in August and September; M3
grew at an annual rate of 1.4 percent in August and was
flat in September.
~‘Ibid.,p. 17. The annual rate of growth of the industrial pro-
duction index fell from 5.2 percent in August to -1.7 per-
cent in September. Revised data indicate that the civilian
unemployment rate in August and September was 5.3
percent.
816.-32
ing by more than the value of exports, the U.S.
merchandise trade deficit improved further in
July52
The price indexes continued to indicate a
lower rate of inflation. In August, producer
prices fell and the consumer price index was
unchanged.” The upward trend in labor costs,
however, did not appear to change on a year-to-
year basis.
The staff’s forecast for economic growth in
the remaining part of 1989 and 1990 were es-
sentially unchanged from those made for the
previous meeting. Growth in business capital
spending was expected to slow from its pace in
the first half of the year, however,’~Most mem-
bers believed that, although economic activity
would continue to expand in the coming quar-
ters, the pace of the expansion would more like-
ly slow than build momentum. While the mem-
bers generally expected some weakening in in-
flationary pressures, only a few thought this
weakening might be appreciable. A number of
members expressed concern that progress
would be constrained considerably if economic
activity were to build momentum. Furthermore,
the members believed that the recent fall of the
value of the dollar in foreign exchange markets
would add to future upward pressure on
prices.”
Most members thought that an unchanged
policy would be appropriate in the near term.
The focus of policy continued to be that of
gradually reducing inflation over time and a
steady policy course seemed consistent with
that objective, at least for the time being.’°
Growth in the monetary aggregates was ex-
pected to moderate from the rapid pace since
the middle of the year, given an unchanged
policy. Most members believed, however, that
future developments would more likely require
ease than restraint in the intermeeting period.
Nevertheless, the recent depreciation of the
foreign value of the dollar warranted caution in
undertaking any easing adjustments.”
The directive issued at the end of this meeting
was written with the understanding that a
downward technical adjustment to the borrow-
ings objective might be appropriate, if, as ex-
pected, seasonal borrowings were to drop in
the intermeeting period. The reserve conditions
contemplated by the members were thought to
be consistent with M2 and M3 growing at an-
nual rates of 6½percent and 4½percent,
respectively, between September and December.
The monitoring range for the federal funds rate
was unchanged at 7 to 11 percent.”
.IV4ye:nhe.r 14 A::leen.ng
Reserve conditions were eased in mid-October.
For a short period after the sharp drop in stock
prices on October 13, an accommodative provi-
sion of reserves was undertaken while financial
markets remained highly sensitive and volatile.
Around the same time, in keeping with the
previous meeting’s directive, a decision was
made to implement some easing on a more per-
manent basis. Incoming data, indicating an in-
creased risk of a weakening in the business ex-
pansion, also prompted additional easing early
in November. Furthermore, in light of a per-
ceived decline in adjustment plus seasonal bor-
“Ibid., pp. 17-18.
“Ibid., p. 18. The decline in producer prices, however, was
driven largely by a continued decline in energy prices. In
August, the seasonally adjusted producer price index for
finished goods fell at an annual rate of about 3.1 percent,
but, excluding energy and food, this index rose at an an-
nual rate of 6.1 percent. The seasonally adjusted con-
sumer price index excluding energy and food, however,
rose only 1.9 percent in August. In their discussion about
the outlook for inflation, the members commented that the
recent declines in food and energy prices that had
dampened price inflation might be temporary. Ibid., p. 20.
‘~lbid., p. 19.
“Ibid., pp. 19-20. The trade-weighted value of the dollar
relative to the other 0-10 currencies fell 2.7 percent over
the intermeeting period. A fall in the value of the dollar,
holding all else constant, increases the attractiveness of
U.S-produced goods to foreign importers and U.S. in-
dividuals. The resulting shift in demand can create
domestic price pressures. A fall in the value of the dollar
can also increase the costs of production for those U.S.
firms relying heavily on imported intermediate goods,
thereby creating additional price pressures. See Hafer
(1989) for a detailed discussion of the link between infla-
tion and a dollar depreciation.
“Ibid., p. 20. There was also a concern that, given the re-
cent 0-7 meeting, an easing of policy would be mistakenly
interpreted as an action to lower the value of the dollar.
The Committee believed that monetary policy should not
be used as an instrument for achieving a given objective
for the dollar in foreign exchange markets if that objective
were not compatible with domestic policy objectives. In the
view of some members, if recent intervention by 0-7 and
other nations were to result in a lower value of the dollar,
the inflationary consequences would hamper the Commit-
tee’s ability to achieve its long-run goal of price stability.
bid,, pp. 20-21.
“Ibid., p.21.
‘8lbid., pp. 21-22.rowings, several technical adjustments in the
borrowing assumption were made during the in-
termeeting period. From early October to this
meeting, actual borrowings fell from about $635
million to about $200 million. With most market
interest rates falling, the federal funds rate de-
clined from about 9 percent to 8½percent in
the intermeeting period and growth in the mon-
etary aggregates gained strength in October.”
The data reviewed at this meeting indicated
that the economic expansion had continued at a
moderate pace. Nonfarm employment gains
were considerable in October and the civilian
unemployment rate did not budge at 5.3 per-
cent. The data also suggested, however, that the
strength of expansion was not evenly distributed
throughout the economy. For example, most
employment gains occurred in the service sec-
tor, while manufacturing employment declined.
In addition, industrial production dropped appre-
ciably in October, though much of the decline
was attributed to several incidents that tended
to disrupt production temporarily (the Boeing
strike, the earthquake and the hurricane).~° The
data also showed that retail sales had fallen and
the growth of business capital spending had
weakened. Furthermore, with the value of im-
ports rising and the value of exports falling in
August, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit had
risen to its highest level thus far in 1989.61
The recent behavior of price indexes were
consistent with a slight reduction in inflationary
pressures. The percentage rise in producer
prices fell in October and, excluding energy and
food, had hardly changed.~’But the data did not
suggest any slowing in the growth of labor
costs.
In light of the temporary disruptions to pro-
duction, the staff’s forecast pointed to a further
slowing in growth in the fourth quarter and a
rebound in the first quarter of 1990. On net,
the staff predicted that economic growth would
continue at a sluggish pace in the coming quar-
ters. Although continuing growth in consumer
demand was expected to contribute to economic
activity in the near term, consumer demand
was expected to weaken subsequently. Further,
the forecast indicated that the sluggish pace in
the growth of business capital spending would
continue and that net exports would not make a
significant contribution to the economic expan-
sion. The staff’s forecast did not suggest, how-
ever, any substantial improvement in the under-
lying trend in inflation,°’
Most members agreed that the data pointed,
on balance, to a sustained economic expansion,
although growth had weakened recently. But
there was no strong consensus among the mem-
bers about the future outlook. While some mem-
bers expected that the risks of a stronger-than-
desirable expansion and a weaker expansion
were evenly balanced, others expected a greater
likelihood of either a stronger or considerably
weaker economic expansion activity, and still
others believed that the chances of an economic
expansion close to the economy’s potential in
the future were not remote.’4 Similarly, some
members believed that progress on improving
the underlying inflation trend might be achieved
given the recent behavior of the price level in-
dexes and other factors, though others saw that
such progress, if any, would be small over the
next several quarters.”
Although the economic expansion appeared to
be slowing, most members advocated a steady
policy with no immediate change in the degree
of pressure on reserve positions. Such a policy
was considered to be consistent with the Com-
mittee’s goals of promoting a sustained economic
expansion while making progress toward reduc-
ing inflation in the long run. Moreover, members
believed that the recent and expected growth in
the monetary aggregates did not warrant any
“Report (February 1990), p. 56. The annual rates of growth
of M2 and M3 rose to 7.1 and 1.4 percent, respectively, in
October. This acceleration was not as pronounced as that
in Ml whose annual growth rate rose from 3.9 percent in
September to 8.3 percent in October.
“Ibid., p. 55. The industrial production index fell at an an-
nual rate of about 4.1 percent in October.
“Ibid., pp. 55-56.
‘2lbid., p. 56. Revised data indicate that the seasonally ad-
justed producer price index for finished goods rose at an
annual rate of 6.5 percent in October. Excluding food and
energy components, it rose at a 2.0 percent annual rate.
“Ibid., p. 57.
‘4lbid., p. 57. The recent depreciation of the dollar in foreign
exchange markets was expected by some members to
provide a source of improvement in the nation’s trade
deficit, especially in light of the observed strength in
economic activity experienced recently by other industrial
nations. Such an improvement would provide additional
strength to the U.S. economic expansion.
“Ibid., pp. 57-58.adjustment in policy. Hence, as table 3 shows,
the directive issued at the close of this meeting
did not call for any change in policy.”
Most members, however, believed that the
possibility of weakening in the economic expan-
sion exceeded the possibility of excessive
growth and, accordingly, that future economic
developments would more likely warrant subse-
quent easing actions than tightening actions in
the intermeeting period. Those members who
believed that the likelihood of excessive growth
was evenly balanced against the likelihood of
weakening in the expansion indicated that they
could accept a directive containing a bias toward
ease in the intermeeting period. But some em-
phasized the need for approaching possible eas-
ing adjustments with caution so as not to
detract from any progress that could be made
in eventually approaching the Committee’s goal
of reasonable price stability.”
The members expected M2 and M3 to grow at
annual rates of 7½and 4½percent, respective-
ly, between September and December. The mon-
itoring range for the federal funds rate was
maintained at 7 to 11 percent.”
ilece,nb.er I ~J II Meeling
During the intermeeting period, policy aimed
to maintain a steady (or unchanged) degree of
reserve restraint. Technical adjustments in the
borrowings assumption were made twice in the
period in light of ongoing declines in seasonal
borrowing. During the first two weeks of De-
cember, adjustment plus seasonal borrowings
averaged about $130 million, down from the
average of about $400 million during the two
previous weeks. Meanwhile, the federal funds
rate remained at about 8½percent and other
market interest rates changed little during most
of this period. Preliminary data indicated that
the growth in the broader monetary aggregates
picked up during November and remained ro-
bust in the first part of December.”
The information available for review at this
meeting suggested that the economic expansion
in the fourth quarter had slowed from its pace
earlier in the year. Although total nonfarm pay-
roll employment made considerable gains in
November, these gains were concentrated in the
service, trade and financial sectors, with conti-
nuing losses in manufacturing. The November
civilian unemployment rate, 5.4 percent, was at
its highest level since January. Industrial pro-
duction in November rebounded from its pre-
vious decline driven by earlier strike activity
among other factors.’°Upon adjusting for these
factors, industrial production appeared to have
fallen, on average, in recent months. In ad-
dition, although nominal retail sales rebounded
in November, sales had hardly changed from
their average in the third quarter, and data in-
dicated a weakening in business capital spend-
ing. With imports up sharply and exports virtual-
ly unchanged, the nominal U.S. merchandise
trade deficit rose considerably in October after
having fallen slightly in September.”
Estimated movements in price indexes contin-
ued to suggest a slight weakening in inflationary
pressures. For example, the producer price in-
dex, based on preliminary data, fell in November.
This decline, however, was partly attributable
to sharp reductions in energy prices.72 Although
average hourly earnings had fallen in November,
the underlying trend in labor cost growth was
not expected to change given the results of the
recent collective bargaining activities.”
The staff’s forecast had not changed substan-
tially from the previous meeting. It pointed to a
slowing in the economic expansion in the fourth
quarter with a rebound in the first quarter of
1990. The magnitude of the rebound was ex-
pected to be limited by anticipated declines in
motor vehicle production. Economic growth for
the rest of 1990 was expected to be driven pri-
marily by moderate growth in consumer spend-




“Record (Federal Reserve Press Release, February 9,
1990), pp. 4-5. The annual rate of growth in M2 increased
slightly to 7.5 percent in November, while the annual
growth rate in M3 nearly tripled to 4.0 percent.
“Ibid., p. 1. The annual growth rate of the industrial produc-
tion index rose to 3.4 percent in November. It should be
noted that the November civilian unemployment rate has
been revised to 5.3 percent.
“Ibid., p. 2-3. Total industry capacity utilization having not
changed in November from October at 83.1 percent was 1
percentage point below its level a year earlier.
‘2lbid., pp. 3-4. Revised data indicate that the seasonally ad-
justed producer price index actually rose at an annual rate
of 1.1 percent in November. Excluding food and energy,
this index rose at an annual rate of 3.0 percent.
“Ibid., p. 4.35
contribution to the economic expansion in 1990.
Further, while the staff anticipated that pres-
sures on labor and other resources for produc-
tion would lessen slightly, no large changes in
the underlying trend of inflation were cx-
pected.’~
The members generally agreed that there was
considerable evidence that the economy’s
growth had weakened and would likely remain
at a sluggish pace in the near term. Although a
number of members thought that some strength-
ening in the economic expansion in 1990 was a
reasonable expectation, most believed that the
chances of a weakening were “sufficiently high
to justify an immediate move to slightly easier
reserve conditions.” Those advocating this poli-
cy change believed that such a move would not
jeopardize the System’s credibility of adhering
to its long-run goal of price stability, as price
pressures and business conditions appeared to
have weakened.
Others less optimistic about the potential pro-
gress toward reducing inflation favored an un-
changed policy. Skepticism about this progress
was partly driven by the recent decline of the
dollar and the possibility that, ifeconomic activi-
ty were to rebound in the next year, inflationary
pressures could gain considerable strength.”
Those advocating an unchanged policy empha-
sized that maintaining current reserve condi-
tions would be sufficient to ensure a continua-
tion of the expansion with an easing of pressure
on productive resources, and that “further eas-
ing might overcompensate for current weakness
in the economy at the cost of delaying progress
toward price stability.” Nevertheless, most of
these members, recognizing the risks of an ad-
ditional weakening in the economy, could ac-
cept a policy that sought an immediate but
slight easing of the degree of pressure on re-
serve positions. In their view, given such a poli-
cy, it was highly unlikely that further easing
would be warranted during the intermeeting
period.”
As indicated in table 3, at the close of this
meeting, the Committee issued a directive call-
ing for a slight easing of reserve conditions.
This directive did not reflect a presumption
about the direction of possible adjustments in
the intermeeting period. The Committee ex-
pected that the annual rates of growth of M2
and M3 would be 8½percent and 5½percent,
respectively, from November 1989 to March
1990. In addition, given the easing of reserve
conditions in recent months and the further
easing stipulated in this directive, the Committee
lowered the monitoring range for the federal
funds rate 1 percentage point to 6 to 10 per-
cent.”
During 1989, the economic data available for
review at FOMC meetings prompted Committee
members to shift their primary concern from
the risks of inflation to the risks of a slowdown
in economic activity. At the beginning of the
year, the threat of a worsening in the underly-
ing inflationary trend drove the formulation of
policy. As the evidence of a weakening economic
expansion accumulated and the outlook for in-
flation appeared to become less threatening, the
Committee became more sensitive to the risks
of a future slowdown in economic activity.
Because the Committee understood that its in-
terpretation of the data was unavoidably subject
to great uncertainty, however, it took what it
perceived to be a conservative approach to re-
acting to this information in an effort to balance
these risks. This approach was also motivated
by the Committee’s ultimate goal of eventually
achieving reasonable price stability and its desire
to maintain its own credibility as an inflation-
fighter.
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